THE DIALOGUE OF GREECE AND ROME ABOUT MUSIC AND ETHICS IN PHILODEMUS OF GADARA

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The Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara (110?-25? BC) wrote a great number of philosophical works, in particular concerning rhetoric, poetry and music. As a papyrologist, I would like to propose a new reading of his *Commentaries on Music* as a result of my preparation of a completely revised edition of this work, in part unfortunately lost, since only Book IV still exists.[1]

This rather dilapidated work is neither a theoretical treatise of musical techniques nor a concise history of music written in the form of a dialogue, nor even a hybrid work of both a philosophical and technical nature in the manner of Sextus Empiricus' *Against Musicians*. It is indeed one of the earliest philosophical commentaries: written in a polemical tone, it refers to an ethical book dating one hundred years earlier.[2] In this work two famous groups are seen to oppose one another on the subject of music: the Stoics represented by Diogenes the Babylonian[3] (second century BC) and the Epicureans of whom Philodemus stands as a staunch defender.

That kind of work is so rare that music specialists will certainly feel interested in the presentation—albeit somewhat brief—of the main features of such a philosophical ethical debate as the one we find in these *Commentaries on Music*. Thus we shall hopefully achieve—as is my present objective—a clearer notion of the way intellectuals between 200 and 50 BC conceived the importance of music, its effects and role in Greece as well as in Rome.

Philodemus' book was studied at copious length by Mrs Neubecker who, for the last forty years, has been working on music among Stoics and Epicureans.[4] And so it will already be familiar to most readers. Yet, as my recent findings have led me to quite a lot of new facts about the book itself—some of them important—I think there is some point in re-examining it as a whole.

But first let us try briefly to sketch out what antique Greek philosophers used to think about the nature of music between the end of the sixth century (for the sake of convenience, let us say from the days of Pythagoras) and the second century BC. Thus shall we appreciate at its best the philosophical dialogue which Philodemus recorded in the *Commentaries on Music* around the middle of the first century BC in which he engaged with someone—Diogenes of Babylon—who in my opinion can be considered the true father

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1. See Pöhlmann 1991 for a recension of the last three partial editions of Philodemus' *Peri mousikès*.

2. Was it a treatise, a dialogue or another kind of writing? We have no means of establishing with certainty. Recently I thought of the possibility of identifying this work with the *ethikè technè*, the title of which is quoted in the testimonies and fragments attributed to Diogenes in von Arnim 1905–24 (part III, 218, no. 39), but the question remains conjectural.

3. Native of Babylon or of Seleucia-upon-Tigris.

4. Her first book was entitled *Die Bewertung der Musik bei Stoikern und Epikureern. Eine Analyse von Philodems Schrift De Musica* (Berlin 1956). Following a number of further studies on the same theme, among which *Altgriechische Musik. Eine Einführung* (Darmstadt 1977), she recently published the final part of the Fourth Book of the *Commentaries on Music*: *Philodemus, Über die Musik, IV. Buch* (Napoli 1986).

of the so-called Middle Stoa which flourished about that time, and who is known to us mainly through the references Philodemus made to him in this book.

I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE NOTION THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS HAD ABOUT MUSIC, FROM PYTHAGORAS TO DIOGENES OF BABYLONIA

1. PYTHAGOREANISM

Towards the end of the sixth century BC there developed in Magna Graecia an important current of new ideas whereby music was accorded paramount importance and a primordial place in human life. What is concerned here, of course, is Pythagoreanism whose founder's image remains rather hazy in spite of the draconian selection of testimonies achieved by H. Diels in his *Vorsokratiker*,[5] and shrouded in a very strange aura. The reasons which incited Pythagoras of Samos to grant an exceptional place to the art of harmonizing sounds are essentially abstract: everything in the universe is numerically based, in his view,[6] and music, which strikingly illustrates the natural relations of numbers with each other, appears as the very proof of the soundness of the arithmetical system of the Pythagorean world.[7] According to Pythagoras, the relations between the distances dividing the seven planets are similar to those within the octave.[8]

2. DAMON THE MUSICIAN

A few decades later, in Athens this time, Damon the Musician, master of the great Pericles,[9] would recapture the Pythagorean conception of an effect of musical harmony on the human soul, in particular as a *purgation* of passions,[10] in order to apply it to the body as well, so much so that one would later come to maintain that a particular harmony could be used in the healing of a particular somatic disease[11]. But as is also the case

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5. See Diels and Krantz (hereafter D–K), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (1971[15]) I, 96–105. For the French translation of the whole work, I shall refer to *Les Présocratiques* (Paris 1988), under the direction of my teacher and friend, J.-P. Dumont.

6. See D–K I, particularly 456–7 (= Dumont, *Ecole pythagoricienne*, B XXII and XXVII, 573 and 575–6).

7. See D–K I, 448–66 (= Dumont, *Ecole pythagoricienne*, 560–84).

8. See Plinius the Elder, *N.H.*, II, caps XIX–XX, and also Censorinus, *De die natali*, cap. XIII: 'On extension of the sky; on earth circumference and on the distance between the planets'.

9. D–K I, 382; Dumont, *Les Présocratiques* A III–VI, 455–7.

10. D–K I, 468, l. 20; Dumont, *Ecole pythagoricienne* D I, 593.

11. Empedocles, with his Pythagorean backround, and other Pythagoreans were also physicians (see D–K I, 283, l. 14 = Dumont *Empedocles*, A III, 327. Undoubtedly, it is according to this tradition that Theophrastus was able to maintain that *aulos*-tunes played with soft modulations (*modulis lenibus*) have the property of soothing people suffering from sciatica. Before him, Democritus said in one of his books—perhaps precisely his *On Music*—that 'a piece for *aulos*, played in a clever and melodious way heals adders' bites, and many

with Damon, it is experience (and no longer an abstract reflection of an arithmetical nature) which brings him to set down a sort of code of correspondences between the various musical modes and psychic states (cf. Rossi 1988, 238–44, and more particularly, 240). Thus the Ancients bring to our notice that Damon had discovered the way of instantly calming drunk youths excited by the excesses of Phrygian tunes: he merely invited a female aulos-player to play a Dorian tune (with the opposite virtues) and the soothing effect was not long in coming. Let us point out in passing that the anecdote, with occasional variants, was ascribed to Pythagoras as early as Antiquity,[12] even if the completely experimental character of this remedy incited me rather to attribute it to the musician of Oea than to Pythagoras.

3. PLATO

If Socrates hardly seems, for his own part, to have entertained any particular speculative interest in music,[13] his illustrious follower, Plato, clearly subscribes at the beginning of the fourth century to the Pythagorean-Damonian tradition.[14] He is convinced that music is of irreplaceable value in political pedagogy. Thus, at first in the *Republic*,[15] then in the *Laws*,[16] he is seen to proceed to an attentive and harsh selection of harmonies and musical rhythms and instruments for ethical reasons as well: harmonies considered as 'soft and relaxed' (cf. Bélis 1982, 57–73), like most instruments (such as *aulos*, *pectis* or 'the instruments with many strings and which render all the harmonies'), are categorically excluded from his ideal City.[17] And again in the *Republic* he repeats, following Damon,[18] that one cannot meddle with musical rules without undermining the very balance of the City. One can appreciate in passing Plato's great faithfulness to the

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human diseases have been cured by playing the *aulos*' (see Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights*, IV, 13). The specific Greek verb is *kataulein*.

12. The same anecdote can be read in Cicero (fr. X, 3), quoted by Augustine (see *In Julianum*, V, 5, 23); in the sixth century Boethius also alluded to it (*De institutione musica*, I, 1). The orator specifies that the tune played for soothing people was spondaic, i.e., full of majesty and gravity (the contrary of iambic or trochaic rhythms, for example).

13. Although with advancing years he decided to attend music lessons given by the citharist Connon, son of Metrobios, as reported by Plato in the *Euthydemus* (272 c and 295 d) and *Menexemus* (235 e ff). But he seems to have met a lot of difficulties while learning the *cithara*, and in doing so he was despised by his young fellows-students. As to the precise name of the citharist, Socrates' master, Connon, Connos or Connas, cf. Winnington-Ingram 1988, 246–63.

14. See the various studies by Bowen, in particular Bowen 1983, 12–29.

15. See the *Republic*, III, 398 d–399 c, in which only the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies are retained, then 399 e–400 d, in which rhythms are dealt with, and this technical point is referred by Plato to Damon's teaching without going into any details.

16. See particularly Book II *passim* from 660 a, in particular 670 d–e.

17. See the *Republic*, III, 399 d: he eventually only keeps 'the lyra and the cithara, for townspeople, and a kind of syrinx for the shepherd in the country'.

18. See the *Republic* IV, 424 c; Dumont, *Damon*, B X, 460.

tradition of attributing to music quite an exceptional power over the human soul[19] even if, in his case, the deeper reason for this conviction is that justice (which constitutes the very object of the investigation carried out in the *Republic*) is defined as being a harmony[20] whose pattern is precisely cosmological: it is the harmony of the spheres (and colours) such as it is called up in the final myth of Er the Pamphylian.[21]

4. ARISTOTLE

Accordingly, it is not surprising that when, in his turn, the Lyceum's founder undertook to compose a *Politeia*, he should have had the same concern about the place music must occupy in the education of the Greek youth: obviously it was already a major preoccupation with Damon in his *Areopagitica*[22]—a work which caused Philodemus to question whether Damon actually delivered it before the austere Athenian assembly in view of the number of untruths he believed it to contain.[23] If the Aristotelian doctrine concerning music hardly seems far from the Academy's position on many points, we must remark, however, that it wanders appreciably from Pythagorean theses on the matter of the status of music. As a matter of fact, Aristotle, who himself wrote a *Peri mousikès* (no longer extant[24]) involving an enquiry into the scientific status of music, regards the harmonic series, together with optics,[25] as 'the most physical of mathematical sciences'. For Pythagoreans, on the other hand, it was conceived as a speculation entirely free from experience:[26] in other words, he 'does not believe musical beings are mathematical

19. Plato ascribed to the body a role—preventative with gymnastics and curative with medicine—similar to that of music (preventative and curative) for the soul. See in particular the *Republic*, III, 410–12 a, and VII, 521–2.

20. Cf. *Phaedo*, 93 e, in which virtue is defined as 'harmony'. Now for Plato, justice was *the* virtue.

21. See the *Republic*, X, 616 b–617 d, in which he describes how the Siren, standing over each of the eight circles of the world, sings her proper note, 'so that the union of these eight voices makes one *harmony*' (617 b), and adds that each of the three Parcae 'sings *in tune with the harmony* of the Sirens' the past, the present or the future.

22. See Dumont, *Damon*, B I–X, 457–60, and more particularly fr. II–IV.

23. Cf. *Commentaries on Music*, Book IV, cols. 147–8 (= 33–4 Kemke) and Dumont, *Damon*, B II, 457.

24. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, V, 26, in which such a title is mentioned twice with the indication: 'in one book'.

25. Cf. *Physics*, II, 2, 194 a 7–12, and Bélis 1982, 72–3.

26. For example Philolaos, who 'gave a mathematical description of a complete musical scale' (cf. Barker 1989, 29).

beings' (Bélis 1982, 74).[27] Besides, the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems* reveal in their author[28] a curiosity and a musical competence even more marked than those of Plato.

Be that as it may, in Aristotle one does not notice any questioning of the ethico-pedagogical conception of music: he seems to have accepted, without any hesitation, the obviousness of the close relation of musical harmony with the soul and also with the body; just as he viewed the concept of music education as being one of the irreplaceable foundations of the moral education of the young (including the approved use by children of stringed instruments such as the lyre but categorically excluding any professionalism[29]). It is a fact that one who learns to play such an instrument is initiated into *sophrosunè*, the 'sense of measure' (in every sense of the word), and will be able later on to harmonize together the different parts of his soul.[30]

5. HERACLIDES PONTICUS

Under these circumstances it is not strange either that, in the same spirit, one of his followers, Heraclides (sometimes regarded as an Academician), composed a *Peri mousikès*[31] (no longer extant) in which he compiled numerous historical anecdotes and ethnomusicological information which served for several centuries as the most important source for the discourses on music: Philodemus, and next to him Pseudo-Plutarch,[32] are good witnesses with their respective *Peri mousikès*, works of musicography which are no longer pure theoretical treatises.

And so from the end of the sixth to the end of the fourth centuries BC we have been able to observe the perpetuation of one and the same conception of music and its functions in relation to man, even if there are variants from one philosopher to another, according to their own respective interests.

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27. Bélis concludes as follows: 'Il est clair qu'Aristote ... donne un statut nouveau à la science musicale; il la subordonne, en fait, à la Physique telle qu'il la conçoit lui-même, et lui donne pour principes et pour méthode ceux de l'Arithmétique'.

28. As is well known, the authenticity of the *Problems* is dubious. However, I am of opinion that the point is immaterial since the orthodoxy of the teaching of the Lyceum is generally admitted in this work. See Barker (1984, 190) who is convinced that the book was not by Aristotle, even if 'the general trend of its ideas is in most cases broadly Aristotelian'.

29. Cf. *Politics*, VIII, 6, 1340 b 30–3, then 1341 a 10–16 and b 8–18. Aristotle expressly excludes the practice of *aulos* (1341 a 17) and professional instruments, as also the *cithara* [for concert] (1341 a 18), the *heptagone*, the *trigone*, the *sambuca*, 'and all the instruments which require intensive manual skills' (1341 a 41).

30. That is what Plato made Protagoras declare in the eponymous dialogue (326 a–b): 'for the whole human life requires rhythm and harmony'. But perhaps we must ascribe to 'rhythm' a Democritean, rather than a musical, meaning.

31. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, V, 87, where he mentions that it consisted of two books.

32. See the publication (together with a French translation and detailed commentary) of the same by Weil and Reinach (1900) rather than that of Lasserre (1954), often disputable in his general views.

6. THE STOIC DIOGENES THE BABYLONIAN (SECOND CENTURY BC)

If one carries the investigation further, one will find this conception was to continue for another two centuries at least: at the beginning of the second century BC Diogenes the Babylonian proceeds to relax the doctrine of the founders of the Stoa, Zeno of Citium and Chrysippus of Solae by establishing the Middle Porch[33] through bringing together the Academy and the Lyceum on many doctrinal points (some of them important). These schools, the latter in particular, provided him with a state of science far more developed and global than that which the first Stoics had been able to set up. And indeed by working in this way, Diogenes, in his turn, is in keeping with an already long tradition of regarding music as an irreplaceable propaedeutic to virtue. However, what seems to set this Stoic apart from all his predecessors since the end of the sixth century BC is a strongly marked desire to provide a 'scientific' basis—i.e., a coherent theory of sensation and knowledge—for the beliefs and prejudices repeated here and there since Pythagoras and Damon.

7. THE FIRST OPPONENTS OF THIS TRADITION: DEMOCRITUS AND EPICURUS

Does this mean that until the middle of the second century this concept of the primordial value traditionally accorded to music and its role in the education of children was never called into question or subjected to doubt? Two illustrious names should be mentioned here: firstly, Democritus of Abdera, then Epicurus who, as Cicero malevolently continued to emphasise,[34] was indebted to the Abderitan for so many things, in spite of his reticences.

Philodemus, specifically in the fourth Book of his *Commentaries on Music,*[35] following Democritus (whom he quotes expressly), reminds us that among the arts music does not possess the antiquity which it is generally accorded, that in fact it does not rank among necessary things, but is really superfluous: that it is a 'luxury', so to speak. Also in the eyes of the father of Greek atomistic conception, nothing entitled it to the prominent place in human life which several centuries of tradition had conferred on it.

As for Epicurus, he is said to be among the first philosophers after Theophrastus[36] to have composed a *Peri mousikès*, unfortunately no longer extant. One can however imagine, with hardly any risk of being mistaken, that he would have sharply called into question the traditional approach to the issue of music, also following Democritus in this respect—perhaps (if not certainly) underlining the capacity of musical harmonies sometimes to create pleasure (which assuredly should not be overlooked) but also and above all its character of unnecessary pleasure.[37] In these conditions, music very likely

33. See the exciting study by Schäfer (1936). We shall return below to this important thesis.

34. See, e.g., *De finibus* I, 17–21 and II, 103.

35. See col. 150 (Kemke XXXVI), ll. 29–39.

36. Theophrastus had actually written a three-volume work under this title (cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, V, 47).

37. Here I resume the categories of desires (and, in connection with them, of pleasures) as expressed in the XXIXth *Capital Maxim* of Epicurus. The *scholium* to this *Maxim* gives us 'luxury foods' as examples of 'natural desires, but not necessary, which only diversify pleasure without suppressing pain'; and as examples

lost, in his view, the exceptional status it had been granted heretofore; and ultimately it may be one of the reasons which permitted his opponents to conclude that Epicurus held no interest for liberal culture in general (for which music was originally, we should not forget, a mere and simple synonym), and furthermore, that all the followers of the Garden were brutes—a reproach which Philodemus violently repudiates in his *Commentaries.*[38]

8. THE PARTICULAR CASE OF THE THEORETICIAN OF MUSIC, ARISTOXENUS OF TARENTUM

In this brief survey of the place accorded to music by the Greeks between the sixth and third centuries BC, one will have probably noticed the absence of an illustrious music theoretician of the fourth and third centuries whom Philodemus calls 'the model musician'.[39] I refer to Aristoxenus of Tarentum who is quite apart from the others, though he was definitely Aristotelian, as was so brilliantly demonstrated in the dissertation of my colleague and friend, Annie Bélis (Bélis 1986).[40] In fact the interest he takes in music is at once that of a philosopher, a technician and a specialist in a very specific field of science, both practitioner and (in particular) theoretician.[41] Being supremely competent as a technician, his standpoint induces him to leave aside all of those ethical concerns which, as we have observed, were a necessary element for most of the great philosophers since Pythagoras.

Without entering into details (this is not the place to do so, and others would be far more competent than am I), I shall simply state that Aristoxenian theory is intended to be strictly musical and aesthetic, and carefully avoids entering into ethical considerations. The best proof of that seems to be Aristoxenus' own comment[42] where he complained of not having been understood by some in the distinction he had drawn between the harmonies, the characters proper to each of them and the different uses appropriate to them. In his own mind, such considerations had no ethical implication: the matter in hand was merely a strictly musical and aesthetic analysis. In view of this we understand more clearly the great importance which Philodemus attached to this *musician*: indeed, in his eyes Aristoxenus was the first genuine musical authority resolutely to have separated

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of unnatural or unnecessary desires, 'the crowns and the statues erected to great men'. In which category would music have been for Epicurus? that of natural desires such as luxury foods? It is plausible; but he could also have ranked it among unnatural desires, since it is an artefact.

38. See in particular col. 140 (Kemke XXVI), l. 15–col. 144 (Kemke XXX), l. 6.

39. Cf. *Commentaries on Music*, Book IV, col. 143 (Kemke XXIX), ll. 16–17: *Aristoxenon eidos tou mousikou.*

40. I wish here to register my gratitude for the useful observations which Annie Bélis has contributed to the present survey.

41. Since in addition to the *Harmonica elementa* and *Rythmica elementa*, in the list of the twenty-seven available titles of his works as proposed in the recent edition of the *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques* (Part I, 592–3, Paris 1989), the following titles may be found: *On the First Time* (10), *On Tones* (11), *On Melopoeia* (12), *A Music Lesson* (14), *On Musical Instruments* (16) and also *On Music* (13). One can only speculate as to whether the latter may have contained items 10, 11 and 12. Moreover, fr. 6 Wehrli indicates that he may have 'exerted, through music, a therapeutic activity', which would confirm that he also admitted—at least from an empirical point of view—the effect of music on the human being.

42. Cf. *Elementa harmonica*, 31, 25 Meibom, quoted Bélis 1986, 97.

music from the ethical, pedagogical reflection whereby it was heretofore regarded essentially as an approved means of leading the child to virtue, thus relegating its artistic character to a place of secondary importance.

And so, since we cannot have access to Democritus'[43] or to Epicurus' *On Music*,[44] since they are no longer extant, the Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara comes down to us as the first to express staunch opposition to the ancient ethical conception of music by means of philosophical argument.

II. PRESENTATION OF PHILODEMUS OF GADARA AND HIS WORKS

Philodemus lived at the time of Cicero and was one of his acquaintances. He was also a protégé of Cesar's father-in-law, Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, and a permanent resident in his house at Herculaneum (cf. Capasso 1991, 164)—the well-known 'Villa of the Papyri'. Born in Syria about 110 BC, he seems to have died after 32 and before 25 BC. A philosopher and a versatile writer like the Master of the Garden Epicurus, he wrote in no less than five volumes his *Commentaries on Poems*, as well as *Commentaries on Rhetoric*, a colossal work the writing of which seems to have lasted over a period of several decades, and *Commentaries on Music*, of which only Book IV is still extant today, and in a fragmented and disorganised condition.

This aggregate of three works was obviously meant, in the writers's mind, as a trilogy whose patent purpose was to make the hellenized Greek-reading public in Rome fully aware of two important realities. On the one hand, the Epicureans were not the coarse and uneducated brutes depicted by their opponents headed by the Stoics, Cicero among them.[45] On the other hand, although Epicurus and his followers envisaged poetry, rhetoric and music in a quite different light from other philosophers, it was for none other than a purely philosophical reason, and not due to their alarming ignorance of these forms of art. I need hardly say that Philodemus himself was a poet who wrote many epigrams (of which some thirty have been handed down to succeeding generations through the *Palatine Anthology*[46]) and that he was well versed in the art of poetry. Philodemus also took a comparable interest in music (even if he was not himself a musician), as is evident in the only Book of his *Commentaries on Music* to survive.

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43. Concerning his works on music, see D–K II, 91–92 (Thrasyllus' Catalogue of the titles of Democritus' books); Dumont, A XXXIII, 760–1.

44. On Epicurus' *Peri mousikès*, see Usener 1887, 106.

45. See e.g., *De finibus* I, 20, 26 and particularly 71–2.

46. The *Palatine Anthology* preserved the text of thirty poems expressly referred to Philodemus—to which we must add the data provided by *P. Oxy.* 3724 (Vol. LIV). This papyrus quotes a total of 175 titles of epigrams; only the authors of 31 of them were positively identified, and 25 of these titles (out of the thirty recognised by the *A. P.*) are attributed to Philodemus. The twenty-sixth title, unknown heretofore, certainly belongs to the Epicurean, so also must the twenty-seventh; the other two relate to two possible authors, among whom Philodemus. Thus today, at least thirty-two of Philodemus' epigrams can be traced. As to the poetic qualities which Cicero recognises in our Epicurean, see his *In Pisonem*, § 22.

III. REFLECTIONS IN BRIEF ON PHILODEMUS' *COMMENTARIES ON MUSIC* IN THE LIGHT OF BIBLIOLOGY AND PAPYROLOGY

I shall confine my discussion to an account of the indispensable facts through which I have grown to think that the only fragments we have at our disposal are those of Book IV of the *Commentaries on Music*.

1. A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE QUESTION UP TO 1985

More than a century ago, J. Kemke, the first editor of Philodemus' *Commentaries on Music*, explained in a Latin preface that what remained of the work represented fragments of Books I and III, as well as the (uninterrupted) conclusion of Book IV—the only part conclusively established thanks to the final *subscriptio*, or title. He based his observations on a conjectural reconstruction that proved to be arbitrary in the aggregate, yet partly plausible. Having established the fact that parallel passages could be identified between the end of Book IV and various loose parts, he conceived the notion that the parallel passages were an indication that Philodemus' First Book was devoted to a general presentation, in chronological order, of the views on music upheld by the great schools of philosophy, ranging from Plato, through Aristotle and his disciples of the Lyceum, to the Porch, with Diogenes the Babylonian as one of its prominent figures. Presuming that only the end of Book IV[47] still subsisted (the last thirty-eight columns, from 114 to 152), Kemke inferred that the initial part of the scroll which contained Book IV was irretrievably lost, and that the missing passage concerned an Epicurean dispute against the Stoa. He took it for granted that Book II was entirely devoted to a vilification of the musical theories of Plato's Academy, and that the Book itself was also entirely lost.

2. MY OWN FINDINGS ON THE BOOK

On the occasion of a new edition for the *Cronache ercolanesi* of what was held by Kemke to be fragments of Book III,[48] I have come to the conclusion that Kemke's assumptions, persuasive as they appear at first sight, do not stand up, and that the fragments of Herculaneum scrolls in our possession in fact represent what is now left of the initial part of Book IV which Kemke and his followers thought to be definitively lost.

To make a long story short, I will merely point out the reliable information I established and the revised interpretation of the parallel passages to which my findings led. From this point on, I shall refer to the parallel passages by their 'correspondences'.

Book IV numbered one-hundred-and-fifty-two columns[49] and measured about eleven metres in length and approximately 23cm. in height. Only columns 114 to 152 have been

47. As early as 1754, Father Piaggio of Naples astutely contrived a wonderful machine with which he managed to unroll the last 38 columns of Book IV.

48. See *Cronache Ercolanese* 19 (1989), 'Philodème, *De la musique*, Livre IV, cols 40*–109*', 49–143.

49. A few very precious stichometric (i.e., numbers of columns) details still extant at the beginning of some columns in the final part are proof positive of this fact.

handed down to us in complete form,[50] which part is roughly three metres long. The initial 113 columns may be reconstructed according to the same pattern from the multiple loose fragments, most of which unfortunately are not original material.[51] After a first attempt at reconstructing this very long *volumen*, or scroll, during which I took account of purely bibliological criteria irrespective of textual contents, I was very pleased to see that the correspondences, largely pointed out by Kemke, did appear in succession according to a regular and parallel arrangement. As I proceeded further with my investigations, I was able to bring to light a greater number of correspondences and this result corroborated the reliability of my method. Columns 1 to 113 are as follows: of Columns 1 to 18, only the upper half still exists (solely as copies). For most of the remainder a number of lines have disappeared, ranging generally between Lines 18 and 25. Some columns have perished accidently (or perhaps as a result of mishandling of the outer part of the carbonized scroll during the first unrolling).

3. A NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE SO-CALLED CORRESPONDENCES

What are we to make of the correspondences? What is evident is that the first third of this scroll (some fifty columns) was written mostly in indirect speech. That portion of scroll gives an account of Diogenes' remarks on music and ethics. Unfortunately no trace has been left of the title of the Diogenian work.[52] The other two-thirds (one hundred columns or so) consist of a series of *lemmas*, that is to say, more or less accurate quotations of opinions previously stated,[53] followed by a severe critical examination in which polemic is an essential feature. We gain the impression that Philodemus had annotated the book of his antagonist before taking it to pieces in order to expose the weakness of Stoic argumentation and the lameness of its unsteady logic.

4. A FRESH INTEREST IN THE BOOK

Philodemus' *Commentaries on Music*, or Book IV at least (this being the only one that withstood the ravages of time), requires thorough reinterpretation as from now and it should be read as a coherent critical examination of a Stoic work, probably ethical, written a century before Philodemus' study.

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50. I.e., 'pages' containing about forty-five lines of around twenty letters. That makes, by column, approximatively 900 types, i.e., 150 to 200 words. The whole Book IV would fill about 50–60 pages of a small paperback book.

51. For the most part, these fragments were destroyed after having been copied (in general, with care, but too often incompletely) by the Neapolitan designers in charge of the Herculaneum papyri (during the nineteenth century for the most part). For that was the only way for them to have access to the lower layer of the scroll which was stuck to the upper one as a consequence of damage sustained in the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 AD. The same process was then applied to the lower layer, and so on till the last which is more or less still extant as a *scorza* (i.e., bark or cortex).

52. In col. 34, l. 1 in the edition I am preparing (= 'Book I', fr. 23, p. 12, Kemke), there is the mention of a 'third book'—probably by Diogenes of Babylonia—but the title is not given.

53. But not all: probably only the most important or, in his opinion, the most dubious, were included by the Epicurean commentator.

That is why I do not think that Book IV was meant as an all-out polemic against the views of former philosophical sects on matters of music. Kemke's assumption is a misrepresentation. The mention that is made of the names of Plato, Theophrastus and Heraclides can easily be accounted for. It was Diogenes the Stoic who mentioned or alluded to these authorities in support of his theory; and I am of the opinion that Philodemus had no intention of making a direct attack upon these luminaries. His own—and only—sitting target was the Babylonian philosopher whose omnipresence in itself reveals Philodemus' purpose. I would like on this occasion to pay tribute to Maximilian Schäfer who, half a century ago (Schäfer 1936), was shrewd enough to discern the importance and the originality of our Stoic writer who initiated a new trend from Zeno and his school to the so-called Middle Stoa. This was Diogenes the Babylonian, and not his famous follower, Panetius, who fathered this new trend of thought.[54]

In these circumstances, the fragments of Book IV are of exceptional interest. To begin with, the Book is proof positive of the continuity of a lively polemical atmosphere between the Stoa and the Garden.[55] Furthermore, the polemic is about a very specific question that had rarely been mooted even if mentioned in passing, namely, the position and the part played by music in the lives of men. Finally, the book reveals the aesthetic doctrines of the two schools and brings to light the fundamental differences between them in matter of sensation and pleasure.

IV. A GENERAL SURVEY OF DIOGENES' DOCTRINES ON MUSIC, AS SUMMARISED AND DISCUSSED BY PHILODEMUS

Only through such a reconstruction can Book IV permit of a global perspective on the book of Diogenes the Babylonian. Diogenes was soon[56] to insist on the effects of music on men's souls and its propensity to arouse temperance and fortitude—two of the cardinal virtues. According to him, music would have remarkable moral efficacy since, through *mimèsis* (that is to say, imitation), it allowed the passage from affections to virtues, from temerity to fortitude, for example. Hence Diogenes inferred a similar influence of music on men's bodies and alluded to the efficacy of the melody, asserting that music was conducive to all virtues (which was a Damonian theory). Accordingly, Diogenes held music to be a 'common good' whose attainment he considered indispensable as far as the upbringing of children is concerned, and whose social usefulness was unquestionably assumed. Following Damon's as well as Plato's views on the subject, the Stoic strongly opposed any innovative steps in matters of music.

Quite naturally, he tended to place these empirical views on a scientific basis by developing the notion that sensation alone, and not the *logos*, established the ethical

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54. Nevertheless, even nowadays most historians of Greek philosophy do not think so; see, for example, de Vogel (1959) Part III, 234–5.

55. This has been testified by many other authors, for example Cicero, in his main philosophical works, in particular, the *De finibus* or the *De natura deorum* in which Epicurean and Stoic speakers vigorously oppose one another under a thin veil of politeness. We must not regard this vigour as merely the result of a *mise en scène* contrived by the father of Latin philosophy, but rather as a direct echo from his own time of the genuine opposition between the Porch and the Garden.

56. Unfortunately the beginning is very incomplete and does not allow us any insight on how Diogenes dealt with the matter of music.

nature of melodies and the peculiarities of each type of musical mode. For this purpose he made use of the theories of Speusippus who drew a distinction[57] between two types of sensation, the one *natural* and the other *scientific*, or acquired, which provided a plausible explanation for the ear-training of musicians and music enthusiasts[58] for which the discursive steps of the *logos* could apparently provide no answer.[59] Philodemus' epitomized version of the Diogenian work continues with a general survey of the uses of music in human activities. One of the most obvious goals of such a representation was to underline the unparalleled universal character of music. With this end in view, he instanced many kinds of music: sacred (for all sorts of events, public or private), military, theatrical or sporting, referring to various ethnic groups in Greece. The conclusion is invariably the same: there is no denying that music has an exceptional power to set in motion and to urge to action the bodies and the souls of listeners. Diogenes went so far as to maintain the superiority of music over the *logos* in this field of human activities.

Music then was seen as an indispensable tool in the preparation of children for a virtuous life. After insisting on the virtues of fortitude and temperance, the Stoic philosopher analysed piety and then two typically Diogenian virtues, namely, *erotic* (i.e., love) virtue and *sympotic* (i.e., banqueting or symposium) virtue in which, according to him, music played a prominent part. Then he made a special study of the virtues of friendship, good humour, concord, as well as intelligence.[60] In each case he strove to show how much music inclined men to practice these virtues, including justice which he studied separately with special reference to Plato. Since, according to Stoic philosophy, the mastery of one virtue was tantamount to the mastery of all, it was obvious that for Diogenes music was the gateway to all virtues. And, relying on Cleanthes, our Babylonian held the view[61] that even without words certain melodies have a meaning of their own, best attuned to philosophy, for it is philosophy which brings one closest to the gods: hence the writing of his famous *Hymn to Zeus*,[62] a musico-philosophical work rather than a poetic one, and of another lyric poem, *On God*, which is a true *Summa theologica*.[63]

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57. Testified by Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. math.* VI, 145–6) who expressly refers to Speusippus, while Diogenes-Philodemus do not utter the name of this Academician, at least in what is still extant of Book IV.

58. In Greek, *hoi philomousountes*, as Philodemus (after Diogenes?) wrote in col. 136 (Kemke XXII), l. 12.

59. As a matter of fact, that is a habit (Aristotle would say 'a second nature') acquired through much practice and strenuous work which allows the musician to make up for the evanescent character of harmonious sounds proper to auditive sensations, and to keep within himself, to a certain extent, the imprint of the harmonious sounds the endless flow of which affects his ears. And indeed one can sense through Book IV that in Diogenes' opinion there existed a decided opposition between 'musicians' and 'non-musicians'. Philodemus, however, attempted to play that down as much as possible for, according to the teaching of the Garden, sensory perception as effected outside of the sphere of the *logos* (i.e., the only place where error can be induced through opinion) is the same for all ears, and the pleasure which proceeds from is almost the same for all listeners (cf. col. 116; Kemke III, ll. 9–15).

60. In Greek, *sunèsis*, i.e., the intelligence which grasps things in the aggregate and understands them in their closest interrelations.

61. As against Plato (we note in passing) who wrote that mothers and nurses rocked and sang their babies to sleep (*Laws*, VII, 790 d–e). On this point, cf. Dumont 1972.

62. Cf. SVF, I, no. 537, 121–3 (testimony of Stobaeus).

63. Cf. SVF, I, no. 557, 126–7 (testimony of Clemens Alexandrinus).

From col. 144[64] to the end of the Book (col. 152)[65] no further mention is made of the name of Diogenes.[66] It would therefore be hazardous to ascribe the critical reflections of the Epicurean to the Stoic philosopher, even if such views are compatible with those of the Stoa. Such critical reflections may be worth mentioning. First, the knowledge of musical harmony would lead to knowledge of the harmony of spheres—which, according to Philodemus' opponent, would bridge music and astronomy.[67] And then, since the imitative nature of music is the driving force of its moral efficacy, Philodemus' opponent stressed the fact that some melodies can be conducive to vice just as others could lead to virtue. In any case, the use of music everywhere in Greece clearly demonstrated that music had been, and still was, an important civilizing factor.

Finally, there was a not inconsiderable disquisition in this Diogenian book on the exceptional prestige of music—regarded as an art directly inspired by the gods themselves—as well as on its development in remote antiquity and on the aristocratic origin of early musicians. And the conclusion, still valid in his time, emphasised the glory and profit which accrued to artists who performed music in society in general, and at *symposia* in particular.

From the evidence of the summary and the critical study written by Philodemus, Diogenes' book was not innocent of recondite redundancies; but it is clear from the present *epitome* that Diogenes' theories were based on history[68] and cogent reasoning.[69] The following aspects of the Stoic views may be summarised:

1) The melody through its action on the senses is a driving force whose effect on the bodies and the souls of men is of outstanding proportion;

2) The underlying arguments of Diogenes' doctrine are based on his conviction that sensation—what he chose to call *scientific* (or acquired) sensation—and not reason, is responsible for the link between melodies (like enharmonic and chromatic ones[70]), moral qualities (like gravity and nobleness as against cowardice and coarseness[71]) and psychic states (severe and despotic humour as opposed to gentleness and persuasion[72]). Before

64. Kemke, col. XXX.

65. Kemke, col. XXXVIII.

66. Whether the lacunary condition of the papyrus is the reason for its disappearance, or whether Philodemus considered that at this point of his commentary it was no longer useful to refer expressly to Diogenes.

67. We note that the name of the Pythagoreans is mentioned only in this one instance in what is still extant of Book IV.

68. Thus Diogenes was in keeping with a long tradition of musicographers, beginning with Heraclides Ponticus (perhaps even with Aristoxenus, as Lasserre (1954, 93) believed) and ending with the colossal *History of Music* in fifty-six books (unfortunately lost) written by Dionysius Halicarnassensis the Younger (called the 'Musician') in the time of Hadrian, and which may have been used by Ps.-Plutarch (*ibid.*, 102).

69. Even if Philodemus reproached him for having in his Third Book initiated an 'historical commentary' rather than developing a 'demonstrative argumentation on God' (Delattre col. 34, ll. 4–6 = Kemke, 'Book I', fr. 23).

70. This is what Philodemus has in mind, probably following Diogenes, in col. 116 (Kemke II), ll. 16–36.

71. As can be read in the same col. 116, ll. 21–5.

72. As can be read in the same col. 116, ll. 26–8.

him, that link had been merely asserted by the remote Damonian tradition, without any logical demonstration.

Or to put it differently, the Stoic's main preoccupation, as seen through the summary, seems to have been the awareness of the effects of music on the psychology and the *ethos* of men, a notion shared by most Greek philosophers. In so doing, Diogenes was attempting to lay the foundations of a science that could have been defined as a real psychological system based on music and ruled by immovable universal laws.[73] In Diogenes' system the musician became an expert in the behaviour and moral conduct of men undergoing the influence of rhythms and melodies.

To put it in a nutshell, for the school of the Garden, which regarded this Stoic theory as stupid,[74] the attainment of truth was through sensations and affections (in Greek, *pathè*), that is to say, the dual notion of pleasure and pain.[75] Diogenes, on the other hand, by adopting Speusippus' theory of acquired sensation,[76] completely discarded the reality of the sensual and affective aspects of musical experience. In other words, it could be said that affections are taken into account by the Stoic only as instruments of moral judgement about what we perceive by ear,[77] whereas with the Epicurean, affections are nothing but criteria of truth: through them, we simply know that we feel a sensation and that some outer phenomenon has produced it.

V. THE POLEMIC REACTION OF THE EPICUREAN PHILODEMUS

This being so, the violent reaction of the Epicurean philosopher can be easily understood. He saw that Diogenes lost sight of the pleasure, or of this pleasure of music, in favour of a highly debatable theory[78] that linked music to morality and psychology. For Philodem-

73. In col. 117 (Kemke III), ll. 3–10, Philodemus exposes this undertaking as being 'without any foundation' and speaks about this Stoic science of the musician as a 'science of non-existent beings'.

74. Terms belonging to the family of the verb *lèrein* occur several times in what remains of Book IV in order to denounce Diogenes' assertions in the work summarised by Philodemus (cols 122 (Kemke VIII), l. 36; 125 (Kemke XI), l. 21; 135 (Kemke XXI), l. 17; 138 (Kemke XXIV), l. 9).

75. To which Epicurus added *prolepseis* (i.e., anticipations of things to come), and later Epicureans, the 'imaginative projections of thought' (*epibolai phantastikai tès dianoias*); cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, X, 31.

76. As proved by the passage which Sextus Empiricus devotes to this double notion (*Adv. Math.*, VII, 145–6). Nevertheless there is some possibility that the Stoic, intentionally or not, has diverted its meaning while borrowing it from the Academician. But the lack of any context prohibits us from knowing more of the reasons which led Speusippus to that distinction between two kinds of sensation. See Delattre 1993.

77. By which I mean that if such and such a melody *pleases* (or *displeases*) me, I *feel* it to be good (or bad) in the moral sense.

78. Since a melody is morally judged in one way by some and in the opposite way by others (col. 116, ll. 21–8), it is clear for the Epicurean that people variously make *arbitrary* connections between moral qualities and the different melodies. From this point he explicitly concludes that the enharmonic and chromatic harmonies do not by nature possess intrinsic qualities which are gratuitously attibuted to them (ll. 28–36): a more severe condemnation of Diogenes' process can hardly be imagined.

us, the appeal of music[79] lay in the sensations and affections it produces, and not at all in its effects on our reason. So that for the Epicureans the evolution of music[80] towards even more sophisticated forms was not a really deplorable thing; for the Stoics, any change towards more complex forms was decadence—an opinion that had long been held by Damon, by the Academicians and Peripateticians, by Diogenes and his followers. What actually Philodemus of Gadara could not bear was the excessive intellectualism of Diogenes' doctrine. As a reaction against the Stoic notion, he adopted radically opposing views and considered music as a purely sensual art, as a source of superfluous, yet not inconsiderable, pleasure, similar to rhetoric and poetry,[81] and having no relation to reason.

Thus we can see that, in spite of what might be assumed from too hasty and simplistic an explanation, the notion (which continued to be accepted in Rome among the Hellenized literati in the time of Quintilian) according to which music directly acts on the senses[82] was not one developed and propagated by the Epicureans—in spite of their well-known materialism. Its origins were very remote, as we have shown, and we venture to suggest that when an orthodox Epicurean such as Philodemus was fighting with energy against this tradition, he did so according to the great principles of his school.

VI. THE DUAL HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL STAKE OF PHILODEMUS' POLEMIC IN MATTERS OF MUSICAL AESTHETICS

Furthermore, I consider it no accident that Philodemus used a whole papyrus scroll[83] to set out his anti-Stoic opinions about music, a subject which was until then not crucial for the school. He was living in Italy (at Herculaneum, as I have already mentioned) where he was the protégé, friend and master of a great Roman aristocrat,[84] and the Roman conception of music was very different from that of ancient Greece—at least for the majority of Romans of the Republic (and after 27 BC, of the Empire). It is true that

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79. Plato used the term 'psychagogy; (cf. *Phaedrus*, 261 a) which seems to have been used again by Diogenes (cf. cols. 125 (Kemke XI), l. 19; 131 (Kemke XVII), l. 29; 133 (Kemke XIX), l. 33).

80. I.e., from the earliest times, so that at the end of the fifth century BC Pherecrates portrayed Music as a character of his comedy *Chiron* where she was roughly handled and sullied by the 'modern musicians'; cf. Ps.-Plutarch, 1141 E ff.

81. These are the two other forms of art to which he devoted even more copious volumes than to his *Commentaries on Music*.

82. This is the thesis suggested by Baudot (1973, 117): 'A l'origine de ce quasi-matérialisme se trouve probablement la théorie de la sensation chez Epicure et ses disciples: pour Rome, Lucrèce. Par l'intermédiaire des sens qu'elle touche si aisément, la musique agira sur le comportement général de l'homme'.

83. The scroll was about eleven metres long!

84. Cicero clearly portrays him under this threefold aspect, and always speaks of him as a *Graecus* (the adjective here refers to his language, not to his nationality, since his origin was Syrian); in one case, he even calls him 'little Greek' (in Latin *Graeculus*), in his *In Pisonem* (55 BC), caps XXVIII–XXX. He also underlines, with offensive irony, the limits which Philodemus could not exceed owing to his 'privileged' position: 'The Greek, easy-going and concerned to please, did not want to prove too combative against a senator of the Roman people'. Nevertheless we consider it excessive to speak of him as a *'directeur de conscience'*, as suggested by Prof. P. Grimal (1977, 240).

Philodemus wrote in the Greek language; but even for those who mastered Greek, the mentality of his Roman readers was the same as that of their fellow citizens who spoke only Latin.[85] They all shared the same ideological belief in the superiority of Rome over Greece which they had colonized. And this we must constantly bear in mind.[86]

1. CICERO AND MUSIC

What might have been the conception of music among the Roman contemporaries of the Syrian Philodemus of Gadara? I will obviously turn to Cicero[87] when looking for clues to this particularly difficult problem.[88]

Unfortunately, though the great orator makes mention of music in his rhetorical works,[89] the better to explicate the rhythmic and metrical particularities of oratory, he hardly ever deals with it in his philosophical works. Nevertheless, in the *Laws*,[90] when he reflects in the manner of Plato on what pertains to the law in various fields of everyday life and more specifically in circus and theatre games, he writes as follows (and this is precisely what our research is about):

> § 38. Since[91] the public games are divided between theatre and the circus, there shall be *physical contests*, consisting of running, boxing, and wrestling, and also horse-races, which shall last until a decisive victory is won *in the circus*; on the other hand, the theatre *shall successfully* sound to the music of harp and *aulos*, the only limitation being that of moderation, as the law prescribes. For I agree with Plato that nothing gains an influence so easily over youthful and impressionable minds as the variety of sung sounds the greatness of whose power both for good and evil can hardly be set

85. One only has to remember Cicero's pride in his Roman citizenship through his main philosophical works—at the very time when he was a professed Philhellene—to understand that there was no true equivalence between his turn of mind and that of the Greeks whose language (and what is more, philosophical language) he used so easily. And often, in the lead-up to his main philosophical dialogues, he vigorously insisted on the originality of the Latin people *vis-à-vis* the Greeks whom 'Rome outstripped or at least equalled in most fields'. Philodemus probably also wrote first and foremost for such an audience, perhaps for only such.

86. Even if some Roman intellectuals had to admit that 'Greece exceeded its conqueror' in the field of culture.

87. That he was a connoisseur of the musical life of his times is clearly shown by this extract from *Pro Murena*, XIII, 29: the proverb 'they who could not become *citharodoi* become *aulodoi*' was among those that were heard from Greek *technitai* who set up concerts in Rome in those days, as Varro testifies (in his *Res rusticae*, 2.1.3): 'Owning a *cithara* is not enough to be a *citharist*'. I am indebted to Annie Bélis for that interesting and judicious remark.

88. Indeed literature usually provides us with the viewpoint of the cultured élite, not that of the multitude, apart from extremely rare exceptions such as Petronius' *Satyricon* (or does it?) and, of course, comedy.

89. In *Orator, Brutus* and *De oratore* particularly. Cf. also his well-known interest in the training of voice, which is typical of Greek culture.

90. In Book II, cap. 15, 38–9.

91. I borrowed this English translation from C.W. Keyes in his edition of *De legibus* (Loeb Classical Library, 1970[8]) while making a few personal adaptations at the beginning (in italics). Though I read *vigeat* (MS H^2)—instead of *vice ac* (MSS A, B) or *viceat* (MS H^1)—as Keyes, I find his translation 'filled with' very feeble.

forth in words.[92] For it arouses the languid, and calms the excited; now it restrains our desires, now gives them free rein. Many Greek States considered it important to retain their old tunes; but when their songs became less manly, their characters turned to effeminacy at the same time, perhaps because they were corrupted by the sweetness and debilitating seductiveness of the new music, as some believe, or perhaps when other vices had first caused a relaxation of the strictness of their lives, and their ears and their hearts had already undergone a change, room was offered for this change in their music as well.

§ 39. For this reason, the man who was by far the wisest and by far the most learned whom Greece has produced[93] was very much afraid of such a degeneration. For he says there can be no change in the laws of music without a resulting change in the laws of the State. My opinion, however, is that such a change is neither so greatly to be feared nor, on the other hand, to be considered of no importance at all; and yet I do observe that audiences which used to be deeply affected by the inspiring sternness of the music of Livius and Naevius now leap up and twist their necks and turn their eyes in time with our modern tunes. Ancient Greece used to punish such offences severely, perceiving long before the event that corruption gradually creeps into the hearts of citizens and, by infecting them with evil desires, works the swift and total destruction of States—if indeed it be true that the strict Sparta of tradition ordered all the strings above seven to be removed from Timotheus' harp.

One should first notice the explicit reference to Plato[94] who deliberately presented himself in Rome as Cicero's spiritual heir. But at the same time he insists on dissociating himself from his famed predecessor in Athens as he qualifies significantly his appreciation of the danger actually involved in a change in the modes and laws of music: 'My opinion, however, is that such a change is neither so greatly to be feared...', he says. Admittedly, he acknowledges that the evolution of music in Rome over one-hundred-and-fifty years is a fact, starting with Livius Andronicus[95] and Naevius,[96] the first poets and dramatists in Latin literature. Musicians slowly gave up the bare austerity of early times for the use (sometimes abuse) of chromaticisms, together with a solid 'physical expressionism'.[97] Cicero does not deny it and expressly indicates that it is 'not to be considered negligible'.

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92. Evidently, music can equally lead to vice or to virtue.

93. He obviously means Plato.

94. In the *Laws*, if only because of the title of the book, and also in the *Republic* (in Book IV particularly, when Plato examines the harmonies and musical instruments).

95. His nickname obviously shows that he was Greek-born. At the same period (207 BC), a *Hymn to Juno* was also sung 'in the Greek way' by twenty-seven young Roman girls (information provided by Annie Bélis).

96. These poets, highly thought of by Cicero because they had founded literature in Rome, flourished in the second half of the third century BC.

97. One may mention incidentally this piquant story which I learnt from Annie Bélis. On the occasion of his triumph over the Illyrians (in 167 BC) General Lucius Anicius had the four best *aulos*-players from Greece summoned to Rome. The Romans had never heard such music before. In the Circus, on the victor's orders, they mimicked a fight, even as they were performing, which triggered a similar reaction from the chorists whom they accompanied. The final result was a true fight, to the utter delight of the Roman spectators, according to Polybius, as quoted by Athenaeus (*Deinosophistae*, XIV, 615 B–D).

Yet he does not attribute any alarmist or definitive consequences to this musical trend, and for several reasons: firstly, because the situation in Rome—from a moral point of view—did not seem particularly worrying to him when he wrote the *Laws* (between 52 and 46), even though the political situation was then very difficult;[98] and secondly, although the teaching of music and music itself were not neglected by the Romans, they did not *de facto* enjoy a universal prestige in Rome to the extent that had obtained in classical and even Hellenistic Greece.

2. CICERO AND PHILODEMUS

So much so that our philosopher could hardly lay decisive responsibility for the moral evolution of the Republic at the door of the changes observed in a particular field of education which, in contemporary Rome, did not enjoy any particular privilege. Moreover, it seems to me that chance does not play any part in the choice of words Cicero makes when dealing with the effects of music. I would like to establish a connection between his words and doctrinal elements that we can find summarised, then criticised, by Philodemus in the Fourth Book of his *Commentaries on Music*[99] and which presumably originate from Diogenes the Babylonian (the elements which directly echo each other have been emphasized):

> *A musical tune arouses the soul profoundly at rest* and brings it to a mood (among those) which the melody that suits that soul <naturally> sets in motion (for all will not be moved in the same way by the same melody); *or, on the contrary, it appeases the restless soul, deeply appealed by whatever and sets it back to rest*; or again, it changes its arrangement, turns it from one desire to another and strengthens or diminishes its present <disposition>.

Moreover, a little further on in the same Book,[100] Philodemus counters the absurd statement by Diogenes, which experience contradicts, that vice-ridden entertainment (and, perhaps, melodies) might lead the public to vice in the same way as morally good melodies inevitably lead to virtue.

Does that mean that Cicero knew Philodemus' Book? Chronologically, it seems to have been quite possible since, according to the chronology of the Epicurean's works drawn up by Gigante (1987, 37–70), *On Music* probably dates back 'to the first phase of Philodemus' activity' (*ibid.*, 47), i.e., before 50 BC. The Latin philosopher may also have had direct access to the text by Diogenes, a possibility which cannot be completely ruled out since, apart from Philodemus, the Roman is the main source of our knowledge (a very incomplete one at that) of this Stoic.

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98. Cicero, though a member of the *optimates* party and so a conservative in politics, was not Sallust who, in *Catilina's conspiracy*, gave an utterly disastrous and lamentable account of public morality in the Rome of the beginning of the first century BC. In so doing he wanted to explain the near-success of the subversive enterprise of Catilina and his accomplices, most of whom were delinquent aristocrats. Sallust regarded that particular event as a forerunner of the fall of the Republic which drew its strength from the moral vigour of the Ancient Romans.

99. In col. 32 = 'Book I', fr. 22, Kemke.

100. In cols 145–6 (Kemke XXXI–XXXII).

But I find it easier to imagine that Cicero was deeply shaken by Philodemus' argument which gave music a much more modest rank in education (— did not that coincide with what could be witnessed in Rome, in practice, in those days?); and he was thus inclined to be far less categorical than Plato, his master, about the risk to the balance of the State as a result of innovation in musical matters. And yet, in that extract from the *Laws*, Cicero does seem to take for granted (because of its seniority?) the traditional thesis on the psychomotor powers and the moral virtues of music—in principle at least—but he never quite manages to disregard objections to that dated conception: why could these not be derived—at least in part—from Philodemus?

And most of all, in view of the limited place that the Roman seems to have accorded to music in the *Republic* and in the *Laws* (at least from the mutilated and incomplete state in which we know them[101]), there remains absolutely nothing in common with that granted it by Plato three hundred years before in Athens, as is revealed (in my opinion, very significantly) by the total absence of the word *musica* and the very rare occurrence of the word *musicus* in both those works.[102]

So much so that Cicero's testimony on the status of music in Rome of the first century BC seems to match Philodemus' *Commentaries on Music* (even though the deeper motives for the way in which they envisage music were not necessarily the same). The fact is that as it passed from Greece to Roman Italy, the status of music changed.[103] And its role, which used to be considered essential by Greek philosophers in building and maintaining

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101. To be quite honest, one should indicate that Aristides Quintilianus in his *On Music*, written in Greek (II, cap. VI: Meibom 1652, 70; Winnington-Ingram 1963, 61; Barker 1989, 465), alludes to a passage from the *Republic*—no longer extant—and added to Book IV by the editors (see Ziegler 1960, 114—5) where Cicero made one of the characters in the dialogue inveigh against music. In the face of such viciousness, Aristides Quintilianus wonders whether such an anti-musical stance can be attributed to Cicero himself, and he contrasts it with the favourable attitude adopted by the orator—or so it seems—in a passage (also now lost) from his plea *Pro Q. Roscio comoedio*: his client danced the pantomime so well that the barrister stated that 'it was the gods' Providence which had given him to men'. Yet, that information of Aristides shows that even though the *Republic* sometimes dealt with musical matters, there was no defence (still less any praise) of that art; if it had not been so, the commentator would not have needed to look to a plea in order to find something to deny that attack against music.

102. *Musicus* is found only in the *Republic* II, 69, and in the *Laws*, II, 39 and III, 32. One should nevertheless point out that those words crop up here and there in his other philosophical works, for example, *De finibus* or the *Tusculans* (cf. Merguet [1887], part II, 621). But the subject of music is never taken up by Cicero—far less treated by him—for itself.

103. It is known that in the second century BC Cato the Elder, out of hatred for anything reminiscent of Greece, had excluded from the schooling of young Romans: rhetoric, philosophy, astronomy, music and medicine, all of them typically Greek subjects. Yet, about one century later, Varro, the famous scholar, a contemporary and a friend of Cicero's, tried to restore those subjects to favour by reintroducing them into the encyclopaedic frame of his *Disciplinae*, in nine books which have been lost. The Seventh Book, devoted to music, was used as a documentary source by Augustine, particularly for his *De musica*, and by Cassiodorus (sixth century) for the chapter on music in his *Liberal Arts*. Only the latter allows us to build up a fairly precise conception of Varro's aesthetics. As for Diogenes of Babylon, one may suppose that, among other sources, he had provided Varro with plenty of documents on music, particularly from an historical point of view. Yet, with the exception of that scholar, who, after all, appears especially isolated, it seems that no other theoretician or philosopher in Rome—at least in the first century BC—had reflected particularly on music, while the long intellectual tradition we have mentioned had kept the Greeks very interested in the subject.

harmony in the City, seems to recede into the background in the Roman Republic.[104] Besides, when the Roman orator evokes such a use of music,[105] he invariably does so with reference to the past, and deliberately relates it to Greece or to famous Greeks: his viewpoint on this traditional conception of music is undeniably historical.

3. QUINTILIAN AND MUSIC

And when, at the end of the next century, the rhetor Quintilian[106] writes his *Institutio oratoria*, if he thinks it appropriate to devote a whole chapter[107] to discussing how useful for his profession it is for the orator to know and study music, one is distinctly under the impression that the references to Greek antiquity that he piles up in those pages are mainly literary reminiscences or pertain rather to some historical information which is naturally proposed to him by the Greek view of musical matters. Such findings tend to confirm that it was not at all obvious to the ordinary Roman citizen of the end of the first century that music had necessarily to form part of the general education of the prospective orator. And if I may say so, I think it was already the case at the time of Cicero who was repeatedly mentioned by Quintilian[108] as being an authority on doxography in the field of music.

For when it comes to teaching the ideal orator as he describes it in his rhetorical works, very little is said about music. So much so that I feel I may suggest that never, in Rome, was music granted—at least, from a theoretical point of view—the importance the Greeks had given it in the Pythagorean-Academic tradition.[109] Of course that by no means signifies that the Romans did not practise it: some of them even felt such passion

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104. Indeed, as has been pointed out to me by J.-P. Dumont (to whom I am warmly thankful for the invaluable observations he made when reading this paper), the opposition between the 'Greek' and the 'Roman' conceptions of music really covers that which exists between Pythagorean-Platonism and Stoicism. To the Greeks, the issue was a political one: it was about having a City which would be the picture of cosmic harmony; the point, then, was shaping just souls by attuning them to that archetypal harmony. On the contrary, the Stoics, whose influence over the Romans was to be so great, thought in terms of reason and natural law—*lex vera = recta ratio summi Jovis*—(but no longer in terms of universal harmony); since, for them, there was no understandable place where models actually existed with harmonious links between them; but since concepts had to be formulated again and again from common notions, the musical model could not be used in the place of reason. Thus musical art became a 'plastic means' destined to reinforce the matter itself of human hegemonic (i.e., the master part of the soul): as a teaching instrument it was used to shape the soul by making it rational; in other words, it helped people to think over law and order (instead of contributing to introducing into it, from outside, a harmony and an order similar to those of the universe, as is found in Plato).

105. As for example in the *Tusculans*, I, 3–4.

106. It goes without saying that his solid training and rich culture were first and foremost Greek, like those of his revered master Cicero.

107. In Book I, cap. X.

108. Particularly Cicero's *Tusculans*, I, 4.

109. In fact not until the sixth century, when Boethius wrote a musical work in Latin (*De institutione musica*).

for it that they became frenzied about it, as did Nero,[110] and evidence of that infatuation is plentiful (cf. Baudot 1973, *passim*).

4. PHILODEMUS AND THE ROMAN AUDIENCE

Thus, to my mind it is quite interesting finally to wonder whether Philodemus' critical commentary about Diogenes' musical doctrine (in Book IV at least) did not also, and perhaps above all, aim at skilfully reconciling (without any philosophical risk) the theories of the Garden with the Roman reality of his time, which was very different from Greece's reality a few centuries before (and presumably still continuing to exist in various parts of Greece). In so doing, he killed two birds with one stone. As he championed the doctrine of the Garden, he gave a good beating to a Stoic opponent[111] who was well-known in Rome as one of the three Greek philosophers who came as ambassadors in 155 BC, and as one of the most approachable Greek philosophers for the Roman literate public of that time.

Then Philodemus showed that he was not a mere brute—as the Epicureans were generally regarded by their opponents—since he was well informed in all that he addressed, and also since his analysis of the status to be given to music took account of every circumstance, including the Roman reality of his time, whereas his Stoic opponents supported abstract theories deprived of any universal value as a result of their ignorance of contemporary Roman life.

Thus, as a protégé of Calpurnius Piso, Philodemus appeared grateful towards his patron, and furthermore, as an intellectual quite conscious of his responsibility in maintaining the orthodoxy of the school, in spite of violent assaults from its adversaries (particularly the Stoics, but also dissident Epicureans[112]), even if he never was a full *scholarch* of the Garden.[113]

In conclusion, I would point out the following: First of all, the Greek philosophers' point of view on music over several centuries has appeared to us as quite different from that of the Romans, even if the distictions in musical theory and practice between the two civilizations may have been less marked. Nevertheless, the historical perspective which I have tried to bring to bear on the great difference in the status of music in Rome as compared to Greece a few centuries earlier, promising though it looks, would necessitate lengthy research into the works of the prominent writers of the Roman Empire. I must admit I am not in a position to carry out such a study at this time.

Secondly, the opposition between Stoics and Epicureans on the matter of music, which I have attempted to highlight, is only an expression of the essential cleavage between—to

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110. See Bélis 1989, 747–68; also Baudot 1973 which shows how interested the Romans were in the musical art, but does not even mention the theoretical and philosophical reflection on music and its effects which could have been developed there: it seems to me that it is proof enough of the (almost) total absence of such intellectual interest among the Romans.

111. Mainly in the field of logic.

112. On this point, see the recent edition of *Agli amici de scuola* in Angeli 1988. Heretofore that work was falsely considered to be a polemic against the Sophists.

113. This has been rightly pointed out by Gigante (1990, 175–98). However, Diogenes Laertius (*Lives*, X, 25–6) does not mention Philodemus as a *scholarch* of the Garden although he gives the names of Zeno of Sidon and Demetrius Lacon, and occasionaly gives quotations of two works by Philodemus (*ibid.*, X, 3 and 24).

state the matter very crudely—believers in a rationalistic system, the Stoics, and the Epicureans, who were more purely sensualistic. Therefore their respective notions about art were of necessity antagonistic: if enjoying life through one's senses was the very basis of Epicurean aesthetics, for Diogenes all pleasure was purged by the force of intellectualisation.

I hope I have thus shown how papyrology of Herculaneum can assist music archaelogy insofar as the—laborious, as ever!—reconstruction of such a scroll immerses us deeply into the intellectual and cultural debate which took place in Greece and also (more astonishingly) in Rome, in the second and first centuries BC.

Papyrology also leads us to a discovery of the position—all the more original for having remained isolated—of the Epicureans in a controversy which is still current: should we or not encourage our children to learn music and play an instrument? And if so, what for?

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

Fig. 1. Map of the Eastern part of the Roman Empire, locating the birthplaces of authors mentioned in the text



Fig. 2. Philodemus, *De musica* papyrus fragment, cols. 147–148 (= XXXIII–XXXIV Kemke), 11–24. (Reproduced by permission)

Fig. 3. Detail of col. 148, ll. 1–13, Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli. (Reproduced by permission)