http://popups.lib.uliege.be/1373-5411/index.php?id=3316 Index terms fr 0 http://popups.lib.uliege.be/1373-5411/index.php?id=4618 This paper attempts to follow the thread formed by anticipation in Kant's general philosophy, and in particular in his theoretical philosophy, in order to tease out the precise meaning of the notion. Particular attention is given to the finiteness of the subject, the notion of teleology, Kant's peculiar account of pure interest and the way in which these notions are interwoven. This serves to clarify the peculiar status of anticipation as a primarily subjective activity, based on finiteness and subjective engagement. Furthermore, an attempt is made to gain insight in the way a subject capable of anticipation is structured and the way it is related to its own structure. Mon, 14 Oct 2024 15:21:21 +0200 Mon, 14 Oct 2024 15:21:27 +0200 http://popups.lib.uliege.be/1373-5411/index.php?id=4618 http://popups.lib.uliege.be/1373-5411/index.php?id=4599 In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defines a principle that he himself terms "unusual" and "startling" : the so-called "Anticipations of Perception", contained in the System of the Principles of the Pure Understanding. The "Anticipations" determine the ability of the understanding to anticipate phaenomena in their matter, i.e. not in that which concerns their form, but in that which is empirical, in that which concems sensation. What is so startling here, is that precisely in sensation, where the subject seems to be passively subjected to the contingency of a material reality, there is a minimal form of anticipation, a form of a priori knowledge. Hereby, the standard 'Kantian' disctinction between a priori and a posteriori, between transcendental form and empirical matter, is, for a moment, collapsed. In the present paper, I hope to show how this principle accounts for the necessarily problematic status of the origin in transcendental philosophy. Mon, 14 Oct 2024 15:10:53 +0200 Mon, 14 Oct 2024 15:11:00 +0200 http://popups.lib.uliege.be/1373-5411/index.php?id=4599 http://popups.lib.uliege.be/1373-5411/index.php?id=3322 This paper takes Hermann von Helmholtz's (1821-1894) psychophysiological theory of perception as a point of departure in examining the conditions of possibility for the process of objectification. It is argued that the epistemological framework of Helmholtz's optics can be analyzed transcendentally on two levels of analysis, namely critical and metacritical. Both levels are concerned with the way in which objectivity is constituted, but while the former is concerned with the imposition of structure by our cognitive organization, the latter deals with the constitutional role of constraint. It is demonstrated how this general epistemological strategy could also help structuring the questions involved in accounting for the internal models that necessarily underlie the activity of anticipation. More specifically, this paper argues that Helmholtz's work could provide some powerful insights into the notion of 'constraint', that is considered to be crucial in accounting for the ability for anticipation. Fri, 13 Sep 2024 15:55:39 +0200 Tue, 08 Oct 2024 17:11:50 +0200 http://popups.lib.uliege.be/1373-5411/index.php?id=3322 http://popups.lib.uliege.be/1373-5411/index.php?id=3341 Looking to the dancer requires looking through the dancer. If a philosophical space intends to figure out and expand the real form and time of the corpus of the dancer, some movements of thought have to unfold themselves in an indefinite reflection, passing through the refraction of an obstinate looking glass. Indeed, the dancer's experience of the real of her body and of the spatiotemporal dimensions she inscribes with her configured movements, is always marked by the looking glass, mirrored, epitomized and reflected. In result, her real body remains untouchable or in-tact, however, split and crumbled into different bodies, levels and parts. This split prompts us with questions on the spacious unity of the real of the dancer's body. The time in where this body is a-life and moving, deciding on when, where and how to direct itself into a beautiful shape and blissful form, constantly ready to give and receive at the same moment, seeing what is coming without seeing, uncovers itself as anticipatory, autonomous and unconscious. Through the concepts Ausdehnung and plasticity, to be unfurled from a cordiality in Kant's and Freud's interpretation of sensibility and the unconscious, I will inform the form of the dancer so difficult to grasp, arguing strongly for the dancer as an anticipatory power : a moving corpus that is time and eternity as well as space and infinity in one. Fri, 13 Sep 2024 16:23:43 +0200 Fri, 13 Sep 2024 16:23:49 +0200 http://popups.lib.uliege.be/1373-5411/index.php?id=3341 http://popups.lib.uliege.be/1373-5411/index.php?id=3333 In §40 of his Critique of Judgment, which is part of the deduction of pure aesthetic judgments, Kant states that, in the case of the appreciation of beauty, it is necessary to proceed in three steps : (i) thinking for oneself ("Selbstdenken"), (ii) thinking in the place of someone else ("An der Stelle jedes andern denken"), (iii) thinking in accordance with oneself("Jederzeit mit sich selbst einstimmig denken"). We consider this way of proceeding as an instantiation of the process of identification, and will address the question why Kant did not articulate a similar reasoning in relation to living systems, that he deals with in the second part of this Critique. We will explore the epistemological potential of identification - which implies a form of anticipation – in relation to living systems and will set out the epistemological specificities that emerge from this viewpoint. Fri, 13 Sep 2024 16:11:26 +0200 Fri, 13 Sep 2024 16:11:33 +0200 http://popups.lib.uliege.be/1373-5411/index.php?id=3333 http://popups.lib.uliege.be/1373-5411/index.php?id=3315 In his book Creative Evolution, Bergson characterizes the project of the élan vital as that of accumulating (solar) energy and dispensing it in an act of singular creativity. The living organism can thus be viewed as the material process that breaches the material order. In this way, the virtual becomes operative in the real through the anticipative procedures of the organism, giving rise to novelty. A similar idea is entertained by Kant in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, where he links the idea of the inexplicability of the organism with that of a breach in the immanent order without appealing to anything beyond mateial forces. In this paper, an attempt is made at clarifying the precise way in which the organism is recalcitrant to traditional notions of explication by examining and relating the views of Kant and Bergson on the subject. Both thinkers struggle to clarify the relation between organization on the one hand and temporality on the other. I suggest that their casting talk of organization in terms of retrograde temporality is an attempt to come to terms indirectly with the challenge the organism poses to any traditional model of temporality. Fri, 13 Sep 2024 15:47:45 +0200 Fri, 13 Sep 2024 15:47:52 +0200 http://popups.lib.uliege.be/1373-5411/index.php?id=3315