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    <title>Auteurs : Asaki Nishikawa</title>
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    <description>Publications of Auteurs Asaki Nishikawa</description>
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      <title>Cognitive Symmetries as Bases for Anticipation:</title>
      <link>http://popups.lib.uliege.be/1373-5411/index.php?id=3059</link>
      <description>In studying human cognition, it is now broadly approved that the study of cognitive biases is indispensable. Among many cognitive biases proposed, we focus on two symmetrical biases: symmetry and mutual exclusivity bias. Implementing the two biases in a probabilistic framework on covariation information, we test our loosely symmetric (LS) model in word learning tasks, in comparison with the ordinary conditional probability and the totally symmetric/biased probability. LS is shown to break a trade-off in the three tasks. It is argued t hat LS is a model of development in the sense of Vygotsky, where top-down/deductive and bottom-up/inductive processes crisscross. </description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Sep 2024 16:05:19 +0200</pubDate>
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      <title>Mandate Game : Model of Anticipation Exchange and Decision-Making</title>
      <link>http://popups.lib.uliege.be/1373-5411/index.php?id=2753</link>
      <description>What types of organization structure are optimal, if cooperative acts must be achieved ? For resolving this problem, we introduced a game modeling characteristics of organizations, inspired by well-known ecoromist K. J. Arrow in &quot;The Limits of Organization&quot;. In this game, each agent gives a mandate to an adviser about his right for decision-making. He tells the adviser his fragments of an anticipation about cooperative acts. The advisers decide act of the agents who gave the mandate to him. The agents get a reward that was calculated by a distance from an optimal act. We used genetic algorithm for dynamics of this game. The network structures of delivering mandates between agents have evolved through three phases : 1) disconnected phase 2) connected phase 3) hub agent phase. Finally, we briefly discussed more abstract model that relates to anticipatory system formulation. </description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 30 Aug 2024 15:25:11 +0200</pubDate>
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