Appreciating the Anticipation of Citizenship Expertise

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Abstract
Taking notice of Atlan's definition of *appreciation of anticipation*, it will be argued that the appreciation of anticipation with regard to *have-not* people takes place exactly at the *interface* of the local systemic dimensions of citizenship *expertise*, i.e. expertise that contributes to the *dynamical* development of becoming a citizen, and the ideal environment of *citizenship* expertise, which amounts to the adherence to a viewpoint in which the notion of citizenship *has to* remain encapsulated by the boundaries of rather static – juridical, political, economical an social – formalities and rules, these dynamical citizenship *experts* are confronted with. In order to make this interface intelligible, the conditions under which community ideals (policy) and group ideals (civility) become possible, need to be revealed from an engaged position that allows for questioning and exploring what it means to be a citizenship expert.
Keywords: Citizenship expertise, anticipation, interface.

1 Introduction

In his *Hatred of Democracy*, Jacques Rancière (2007) argues that the dominant perspective on democracy life is entirely focused on controlling two excesses. On the one hand there is the excess of overt participation in democratic life; on the other hand there is the excess of individualistic consumerism. As such, limits are put on the way democratic life can and should develop. These limits can either be identified as physical, either as imaginary borders, which, in the dominant discourse with regard to 'participation in the society of knowledge', should not be crossed.

Concerning physical borders, Rancière points out that they are established by the delineation and partitioning of the prevailing modes of perception on which he says the following:

> Occasionally translated as the 'partition of the sensible,' *le partage du sensible* refers to the implicit law governing the sensible order that parcels out places and forms of participation in a common world *by first establishing the modes of perception within which these are inscribed.* The distribution of the sensible thus produces a system of self-evident facts of perception based on the set horizons and modalities of what is visible and audible as well as what can be said, thought, made, or done. Strictly speaking, 'distribution' refers to both forms of inclusion and to forms of exclusion. (Rancière 2007, p. 85, italics added)

In a way Rancière's statement is reminiscent to what Marx said about the senses: "The forming of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present" (Marx, 1964, p. 141). Marx however saw the moment of theorizing about this 'forming' and 'history' postponed to the end of capitalism. Rancière on the other hand points aptly out that the time is now. Or not? At first hand, *le partage du sensible* Rancière refers to, seems to have a lot in common with Kant's perspective on objectification, better, constituted objectivity. This is about (i) the fact that *subjectivity* takes part in experience; (ii) *necessity* with regard to the fact that there *needs* to be conformity between the understanding, which is capable of forming concepts and rules that relate to experiential knowledge, and constitutes experience.

The point Kant makes here, i.e. in his *First Critique*, is that experience needs a way of knowing that requires understanding. To put it in other words, it is not so that experience 'constitutes' these concepts (*Begriffen*) but it is the concepts that constitute experience. But, are these concepts to be considered to be on the same level as the 'establishing of the modes of perception' Rancière talks about? Not exactly. What Rancière takes up, is the idea that concepts that constitute experience can be transformed, visualized and communicated in such a way that these concepts disallow experiences to emerge which were previously unrecognizable *as* experiences because the delineation of what counts as a concepts, within the dominant discourse on democracy, has restrained the field of possible experience. This does not mean however that Kant's ideas are not useful. But therefore we need to take a look at what he says about *co-constitution* in his *Third Critique*, more specifically in the second part of it on teleology. Here he says that the constitution of objectivity as proposed in his *First Critique* becomes really problematic when it comes to living systems, which are deemed impossible to be objectified. The solution here is situated in subscribing to a co-constitutive perspective, which is about "knowledge [being] the *result* of a co-constitution, a *co-determination between two terms*. It involves on the one hand the knowing (observing) instance, with its choices, purposes and interests, and on the other hand the living (observed) system" (Van de Vijver et al., 2005, p. 66). The point here is that the observer *and* the perspective he/she upholds matters.

Matsuno articulates such involvement at hand from an *interface* perspective linking first and second person descriptions (pertaining to the *describing* 'observing instance' that makes use of the present progressive tense) with third person descriptions (pertaining to the *described* 'observed' in the present perfect tense). He writes:

> The interface between the present progressive and the present perfect tense provides us with both the capabilities of ascertaining the regularity of empirical observations, when viewed from the side of the perfect tense, and holding the generative capacity of movement, when viewed from the side of the progressive tense. The robust interface between the present progressive and the present perfect tense is in fact embodied in what we call matter. (Matsuno, 2002)

This embodiment of matter, which, from an interface perspective, *challenges* 'what we call matter' by making use of *only* third person descriptions, relates closely to the

way Rancière, who not only challenges 'what we call matter' but also makes room for *supplementing* 'what we call matter', thematizes those acts that 'break through' what is currently allowed to be registered as visible and communicable, i.e. through acts of *dissensus* or *subjectivation* that 'break through', challenge and supplement, forms of inclusion and exclusion.

Such forms of inclusion and exclusion relate to the way borders are imaginarily sustained, which means that they are ideationally constructed and taken up as unified. What is formally delineated by these borders pertains exactly to what it *is* – not what it *means* – to be a citizen. This delineation functions as the operational limit drawn out by a perspective, in this case the perspective taken up by 'the government', that validates its own ideational rationale, i.e. only those additional perspectives that operate *within* or *along with* the limits of the dominant perspective are allowed access. The consequences of upholding such a tautological viewpoint are (i) that taking up such a unique perspective cannot but fail to take into account the sequential dynamics present in local events and thus can only subscribe to the perspective – which is, as already mentioned, about taking up a perspective within a perspective, not about taking up perspective *as* perspective – that is solely guided by global simultaneous operations and descriptions[1] and (ii) that only one 'idea' is allowed to exert its power, which hardly leaves any room for change to happen. The problem at hand here is that all that is to be 'had' or 'owned' in such a world – that subscribes to global and simultaneous operations and descriptions – is some kind of inert loyalty to the border that delineates and endorses what it *is* to be a citizen by moving within or going along with what *is* to interact on a group level and what it *is* to subscribe to the dominant ideational community level.

In this article, this problem will not so much be tackled by explaining how exactly this loyalty shows itself, but by exploring how human engagement on local 'have-not' levels (group) *and* human knowledge that 'survives' on global levels (community) are both conditional for establishing an interface where 'the materiality of human agency' can become visible and communicable. By taking into account Atlan's definition of *appreciation of anticipation*, it will be argued that the appreciation of anticipation with regard to *have-not* people takes place exactly at the *interface* of the local systemic dimensions of citizenship *expertise*, i.e. expertise that contributes to the *dynamical* development of becoming a citizen, and the ideal environment of *citizenship* expertise, which amounts to the adherence to a viewpoint in which the notion of citizenship *has to* remain encapsulated by the boundaries of static – juridical, political, economical an social – formalities and rules, these dynamical citizenship *experts* are confronted with.

It will be argued that, in order to make this interface intelligible, the conditions under which ideal policy (drawn out at the level of the community) and ideal civility (drawn out at the level of the group) become possible, need to be revealed from an engaged position that is allowed to question and explore what it means to be a citizenship expert.

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[1] The terminology 'sequential dynamics ' and 'global simultaneous operations and descriptions' is borrowed from Matsuno & Salthe (1995).

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2 (Crossing) boundaries

The problem with adhering to the viewpoint that there indeed *are* such 'things' as borders has everything to do with the way society is perceived as complicated while at the same time it is taken to be complex. Thus, while it is acknowledged that society is becoming more complicated in the way that, e.g. legal citizenship, participation society and democratic ownership are complicated but possible to be inscribed and sustained in the dominant community level discourse, society is taken to be complex in the way some problems, such as the explosion of (undocumented) immigration, the proliferation of multi-cultural ways of life and the increase of interpretations of what democracy exactly means, seem impossible to be solved. The current solution, which is provided by the dominant discourse, is to take notice of these complex problems while at the same time pushing them forward into a (near) future, i.e. to a moment in time where these problems transform into 'merely' complicated ones so that they can 'finally' be solved. The example of 'participation in society of knowledge' is a good one to make the point.

Participation in society *of knowledge* is one of the key principles put forward by the 2000 Lisbon Agreements.[2] To date, this principle, together with 'work for all' and 'social integration', fails to access the public space intended. One possible argument for such a failure might lie in the fact that participation in society – without the 'knowledge' addendum – is, not so much being ignored as 'controlled' as Rancière would put it. What is 'controlled' are exactly those aspects of societal conduct where on a group level, *through ideas* and the implementation of them trough public participation in the society of knowledge, a common ownership can be ascertained, i.e. 'civility', and on an individual level, *through practices* such as individualistic consumerism, freedom can be claimed.[3] Neither of those two conducts however is allowed to develop freely and needs to be controlled. This means that the border that cannot be crossed is that of a 'too engaged' participation in democratic life and of a 'too individualistic' way of life. This also means that participation in society – without the 'of knowledge' addendum – is fixated at the border of what is allowed to emerge as 'participation', i.e. what is allowed to emerge as participation in the society *of knowledge*, but also that the life of the individual is compulsorily equated with individualistic consumerism, thus disallowing other aspects of individual agency and engagement to emerge as a possibility.

As policy and policy-making is only about making intelligible the ideal of its machinery, which is unquestionably presented 'as it *is*', the responsibility of validating this ideal is entirely left in the hands of the individuals or groups to which this ideal is projected. The tool provided by policy-makers for validating this ideal is called 'rights'. It is exactly by making reference to 'rights' that 'control mechanisms' can 'freely' exert their power. It is exactly by including 'rights', a 'yes-or-no', a 'more-or-less', an 'either

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[2] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm
[3] It should be noted that Rancière himself does not use the phrase 'participation in the knowledge society' and refers to 'participation in democratic life'. In this article both will be used interchangeably.

in or out' dialectic is inserted into the community that functions as the necessary and only condition for what it *is* to participate in the society of knowledge. As such, the only perspective in which rights can claim their place is in a discourse that allows for a dialectical equality-inequality tension as provided by the sociologist T.H. Marshall. Indeed, within Marshall's right's perspective, an individual, while he is considered the equal of all others in society *qua* citizen, remains unequal in social class (Marshall, 1950).

Almost everybody would be inclined to solve this awkward tension. Anthony Giddens' solution is one of them. His is located, neither within the civil nor the social sphere but in the governmental sphere (Kivisto and Faist, 2007). To put it in other words, this is a task to be taken up by 'political citizens', i.e. by citizens that put constraints on the expertise a 'competent' citizen is allowed to expose. In Giddens view, "civil society serves first and foremost as a *public sphere*, a forum wherein citizens can enter as equals to debate the major issues of the day and to *participate* in constructing a shared vision of community" (Kivisto and Faist, 2007, p. 98-99).

Though Giddens opens up here a realm where equality can be addressed, his view that the task of reducing inequality can only be taken up by 'the government', in fact sustains inequality. This sustainment has everything to do with the implications of adhering to a participation discourse and framework. So what does such a participation discourse ask of those involved and what does it exclude?

Perhaps the best way to point out the inherent implications of subscribing to a participation discourse is to refer to the way 'have-not' people are confronted with this discourse. As such during my own state-of-the-art research on undocumented migrants[4], it became increasingly clear that the whole discourse on undocumented migrants is explicitly framed within a juridical language. In fact, the language alone disallows them to take up their 'rights' to speak up. I.e. they cannot make the same formal claims – and most importantly make these claims visible and communicable – in the same way a 'legal' citizen is currently allowed to manifest them, i.e. they even cannot enter the yes-or-no realm as their position as such is taken to be the opposite *ideal* of what it is to participate in the society *of knowledge* they have come to live in. From this follows that participation in society as such becomes quite problematic for undocumented migrants, at least not in the formal 'knowledge' version of it in which 'the government' defines the boundaries of what a citizen can or cannot do. Surely, undocumented migrants *are* supported by 'pressure groups', such as workers unions. However, these pressure groups do no more than subscribing to a *citizenship* expertise perspective and restrict their *participation* to what can be formally done to change the formal situation of undocumented migrants, rather than to explore what becomes possible if their *contributions* to society are taken into account. However, their struggle to 'get papers' is barely recognized as an action that relates to participation in society.

As such, crossing boundaries is hardly an option for undocumented migrants: you become either 'in' after a regularization procedure, or remain 'out'. As undocumented

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[4] I refer here to research performed for Profacity, a 7th Framework program that focuses on exploring profane citizenship in hybrid situations.

migrants do contribute to society, through their actions, the (illegal) work they perform but also the perspectives they introduce in the society they have come to live in, there must be something wrong then with the concept of participation in society of knowledge, a concept that is believed to be implementable on a global scale. A redefinition of citizenship and how it functions, not by taking up *either* a participation, *or* a contribution perspective, but by exploring the possibility of an *interface* that allows both possibilities to emerge while at the same time negating their distinction, might bring us out of this conundrum.

3 Citizenship expertise

Brian Wynne (1996), among others, was one of the first to define profane expertise as knowledge that is not oriented towards scientific progress but rather to solving the practical problems experienced by its adepts. Profane expertise *contributes* to the elaboration and socialization of knowledge, including scientific knowledge. Wynne's STS research shows that profane knowledge is not merely "local", and that it can develop on various scales, in non-contiguous spaces of recognition. Analogically speaking, then, profane citizenship is also not limited to local *recognition*, for example within a circle of *participating* friends.

Though Wynne's account of profane expertise does open up perspectives within the realm of scientific business, in order to account for the position taken up in this article, the realm of *invisible* expertise, or at least expertise that does not make it to the realm where one is allowed to participate but does *contribute* to society, needs to be taken into account. In order to render such an 'invisible' expertise visible and communicable, a reconfiguration of the way citizenship expertise emerges *as* citizenship expertise is necessary.

The necessity of such an exploration is called for, not so much in order to tackle legal and traditional citizenship per se but to explore the dimensions of citizenship that are formed on a local level where citizenship is (sometimes 'illegally') *practised* rather than at scales such as the State, where citizenship is (always 'legally' and 'ideally') *theorized*. In this way it becomes possible to focus, not on what it means to be in a *have-not* situation but on what can become possible by either 'being in' or 'taking on' a *have-not* situation or perspective, which allows for rendering intelligible the practices *and* ideals that emerge here not as pertaining to or fixated at the limits of society but as meaningful with regard to citizenship.

3.1 *Citizenship* expertise, a definition

Citizenship expertise, with the emphasis on citizenship, amounts to adopting the perspective that citizenship is the keyword in disclosing the expertise needed to be a 'competent' citizen. This disclosure however, unavoidably remains trapped within an idealistic participation discourse which, as mentioned earlier, is operationalized in a juridical framework in which the undocumented migrant is not only not allowed to voice or make visible his *contributions* to society but is also considered to be either a

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'victim to be helped' or a 'victimizer to be expelled'. On the one hand, as 'victim to be helped', the aid is purely oriented towards embracing the undocumented migrant within a framework that supports the 'participation in the society of knowledge' discourse. In concreto this means, at least in the Belgian case, that undocumented migrants *can* receive help from social organizations in order to receive assistance on administrative matters and *can* engage a lawyer to help them with the procedures concerning asylum, regularization or when their rights are violated in performing (illegal) work.[5] On the other hand, as 'victimizer to be expelled', the undocumented migrant can either be seen as a criminal not obliging to the laws that define the conditions for entering and remaining in the receiving country, or as a possible 'anarchistic element' that endangers the 'citizenship boundaries' put forward by 'the government' as he enters the receiving country with new ideas, new ways of engaging in economic life, new ways of socializing, etc. The point is that while the latter can also be formulated from another perspective in which his agency is recognized as an actual contribution to society, within the strictly delineated perspective taken up in the 'participation in the society of knowledge' framework, these contributions, which have the potential to enlarge what it *means* to participate in society as such, quasi a priori fail to gain access to the realm enclosed by what it ideally *is* to participate in society.

The reason for this failure can be situated in the way control mechanisms aim at transforming local practices into socialized civic ideals, which in turn are taken up as unquestionable perspectives.[6] A way out that allows these perspectives to be questioned is to consider them *as* perspectives, i.e. to allow them to exist as constraining elements, not as obligatory elements. As such it becomes possible to allow for individual agents to ascribe *meaning* to these constraining perspectives, i.e. supplement them so that the ideal of community no longer remains the sole prerogative of 'the government'. In this way the ideal community perspective is no longer to be considered as detached from the agents that ultimately contribute, i.e. take up, in one way or the other, their *own* 'ideal' position in society. However, in order that these individual contributions do not remain within the solipsistic sphere, their agency must also orient itself to reorganize or even reconfigure the interactions that take place on a local – group – level so that these interactions can be taken into consideration as possible contributions rather than necessary participations. The aim of such reorganization and reconfiguration of

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[5] Though undocumented migrants have no legal right to have a job, they *are* protected when their labour rights are violated even when performing an illegal job. One of the organizations that supplies such help in Brussels is O.R.C.A., the Organization for Clandestine Labour Migrants (www.orcasite.be).

[6] The term 'civic' refers explicitly to the way persons and groups conform to some form of social cohesion that is juridically supported. Within the context of research on immigrant activation in society, Dita & Triandafyllidou (2005, p. 4), define active civic participation as "continuously investing time and energy to organize solidarity or give voice to societal concerns in the receiving society". With regard to active citizenship, Hoskins et al. (2008), in their model on page 14 define 'civic competence' as pertaining to a cognitive level where knowledge and skills are learned and an affective level where attitudes, values and intended behaviour is learned. The point that is made in this article is that those definitions relate to an ideal perspective on what citizenship *is* or should be, rather than on how citizenship is practised and it actually *means*.

interactions is to lay bare the conditions under which these interactions can emerge as contributions *and* participations.

A way to render intelligible the agency of the individual that is allowed to give meaning to perspectives while at the same time being constrained by them and that reconfigures interactions so that the conditions of group participation and contribution becomes possible, the citizenship perspective that only allows *citizenship* experts to access the public realm needs to be challenged and supplemented by the citizenship perspective that allows for citizenship *expertise*.

3.2 Citizenship *expertise*, a definition

In the current literature, be it philosophically or sociologically inspired, almost no reference is made to citizenship *expertise*, i.e. expertise that allows for recognizing that there indeed is room for *individual* contributions that challenge and supplement the framework that upholds participation in the society of knowledge. This does not mean however, that on the *group* and the *community* level, these *experts* cannot exert a meaningful influence.

Firstly, related to the group level, citizenship *expertise* is about this kind of individual agency that revisits the conditions of group dynamics by exploring what remains, within the dominant *partition of the sensible*, invisible and impossible to communicate. The necessity of such a task is indeed called for as any particular group dynamics espouses ideals that limit such individual explorations as, at the group level, the same border principles are upheld as those composed by policy-makers at the community level. As such, in the same way these borders cannot be crossed at the community level, they cannot be crossed at the group level.

Secondly, with regard to the community level, which, as previously touched upon, can be equated with the level at which democratic life is enclosed by the ideals put forward by policymakers that aim at operationalizing these ideals by implementing them through a framework in which only these forms of participation count that can be measured by the standards the framework upholds, the address of 'community' can only become meaningful from individual perspective that at the same time is constrained by the upheld framework. This means that it is up to the individual to take up the perspective *that* the framework that upholds 'participation in the society of knowledge' is meaningfully 'there' *as* a perspective, but that 'what' it *is*, is dependent on the engagement of the individual.

As such, citizenship *expertise* is that kind of expertise in which meaningful engagement is elicited in those contributions that explore the possibility of an interface that relates 'local' group interactions with 'global' community ideals.

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4 Interfaces

4.1 Citizenship expertise revisited

The ideals set forward on the community level, at which the limits of what counts as participation in the society of knowledge are constructed and taken over at the group level where participation to the society of knowledge is exercised, often – seem to – lead to a clash because the dynamics of interactions at the group level tends to 'overrule' – not 'bypass' – the ideals set forward at the community level. This however, does not mean that the ideals that pertain at the community level are indeed challenged and meaningfully supplemented at and from the group level, but that the interactions at the group level are merely allowed to expand. This expansion 'overrules' the community ideals in such a way that the ideals at the group level are simply reinterpreted for the sake of complementing the ideals set forward at the community level.

The idea of the group as a field of possible 'overruling' or 'reinterpretation' of the dominant ideal is reminiscent of the way Kurt Lewin has defined the group as "a state of continuous adaptation" (Burnes, 2004, p. 981) and concluded that "[c]hange and constancy are relative concepts; group life is never without change, merely differences in the amount and type of change exist" (Lewin, 1947, p. 199). But how does this change occur? The position taken up in this article is that adaptive change remains unavoidably trapped in the dominant ideal in which the agents of change can only subscribe to a 'yes-or-no' reinterpretation of this ideal, often by taking up their 'rights' (supra). On the one hand, by subscribing to the dominant community ideal in an affirmative way, an individual can indeed bring about change but only if this element of change is allowed access among the prevailing interactions that constitute group dynamics – which can only subscribe to the ideals previously laid out by policymakers at the community level. On the other hand, by taking up a negative attitude towards the dominant community ideal, one still subscribes to it in the way that it provides the means to challenge this ideal. The point is that while challenging the dominant ideal might bring about new ways of *participating* in the society of knowledge, meaningful contributions still remain 'unnoticed'.

As such, either by taking up a 'yes' of a 'no' position, the elements of change and the adaptations they bring about evolve merely at the moment at which the complexity of the dominant ideal is not so much noticed *as such* but noticed *in part*, i.e. that it is noticed that part of complexity has become merely complicated and thus 'solvable'. In this way however, not the concerns of individuals are addressed but the ideals of the community, the level at which new amendments and laws can be laid down that enlarge the realm of what counts as participation but diminish the realm in which meaningful contributions can emerge.

Off course, what counts as participation in the society of knowledge indeed can emerge out of local contributions. As such, when Jacques Rancière (2009) addresses what he calls 'acts of subjectivation', he explicitly refers to those contributions that 'break through' and aim at 'supplementing' what is, within the community, allowed to

emerge as 'communication'. However, while such 'acts of subjectivation' do provide a supplement of meaning on the community level, they do not emerge out of group level interactions that were previously 'invisible'. On the contrary, they emerge (i) out of a divide that, though complex, is noticeable – and thus *visible* – on the community level and (ii) out of a particular group dynamics that voices its 'no' towards the community ideals that have installed this divide.[7] As such only one 'ideal' is addressed, i.e. the community ideal, while the conditions that constitute the ideal interactions at the group level remain unchallenged.

Now, if citizenship expertise is about allowing the 'invisible' to become 'visible' and if this 'invisibility' is indeed communicable from the perspective of the individual, a way to make it possible to revisit the conditions under which interactions at the group level emerge as *either* 'visible' *or* 'invisible' needs to be addressed. This amounts to taking up the question how both 'visible' *and* 'invisible' (inter)actions can be *anticipated*, i.e. how and to which extent the capacity of abstraction of a describing instance, i.e. an engaged individual, can render intelligible the conditions under which interactions emerge as participatory, which pertain to the dominant ideal, *and* contributory, i.e. pertaining to an individual ideal.

4.2   The appreciation of anticipation, a possible conclusion

So how can an individual rearrange what counts as interaction, i.e. revisit the conditions under which participation in the society of knowledge becomes possible? To put it in other words, how can a group interactions be challenged so that contributions can emerge as a supplement to the interactions that ideally prevail, i.e. how can contributions be anticipated?

Here Atlan's viewpoint on intentionality, the perspective from which he says that "the appreciation of anticipation takes place at the interface between a system and its environment" (Atlan paraphrased in Van de Vijver, 1998, p. 34), allows room for thematizing the notion of *engaged anticipation* – which positions itself between strong anticipation and weak anticipation as defined by Dubois.[8] On the one hand, strong anticipation, which refers to an anticipation of events built by or embedded in systems can be seen to pertain to the anticipation of participatory practices constrained by the ideals set forward at the community level, the embedded system par excellence. Weak anticipation, which refers to an anticipation of events predicted or forecasted from a model or a system, can be seen to pertain to the anticipation of contributory practices that emerge out of the dynamical group dynamics and that draw upon a rights model in

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[7] Rancière himself gives here the example of Rosa Parks, the black woman that refused to offer her bus-seat to a white man in 1955 in Montgomery, Alabama. Her action, which was in fact co-ordinated at a particular group level that wanted to address this problem, and for which she, i.e. it could have been somebody else, was selected to perform the 'act of subjectivation', made possible a whole 'new' movement on civil rights. It should be noticed however – the exact point will be clarified in a forthcoming article – that the group level was not exactly challenged as such. What her action did attest to take up democracy as the space where it becomes possible to say 'no', which is exactly the point Rancière makes in his Hatred of Democracy (2007).

[8] http://www2.ulg.ac.be/mathgen/CHAOS/CASYS.html

which the ideals set forward at the community level can be 'dynamically' tested at the level of the group. Neither forms of anticipation however, can adequately take into account the *ideal position* of the individual as an engaged individual. For such an engaged individual, not so much anticipation, which always relates to the ideal system or model, but the *appreciation* of anticipation, which makes it possible to critically reconfigure the prevailing *partition of the sensible*, needs exploring. As such, *engaged anticipation* can be defined as *materially* positioned at the interface of the local systemic dimensions of citizenship *expertise*, i.e. expertise that contributes to the dynamical development of becoming a citizen, *and* the ideal environment that requires an adherence to *citizenship* expertise, which pertains to the belief that citizenship *has* to remain encapsulated within the boundaries that enclose the ideals set forward at the community level.

Becoming a citizen then can be made intelligible from the perspective that individual contributions are not to be seen as enclosed in the private (group) sphere, nor to be viewed as enlarging what can become possible in the public (community) sphere, but, as already mentioned, supplement the ideals of the community while challenging the interactions that take place in the group. This *becoming* is neither about establishing a 'new' community, nor a 'new' group but about opening a space of learning in which *equality* as well as with regard to intelligence as to the environment can be anticipated. By taking up the perspective that all intelligences are equal (Rancière, 2009), one not merely recognizes that intelligences should a priori be equal but that the potential from which intelligence emerges as intelligence is equal for all and that intelligence as competence – either participatory or contributory, either from a *citizenship* expertise or citizenship *expertise* perspective – has to be taken up as a degree that does not dissolve the equality of intelligences that grounds citizenship expertise.[9] This degree can only become visible and communicable from the perspective that the environment is likewise equal for all, i.e. that the context in which an ideal environment is drawn out, be it either on the group or on the community level, while its sensibility is indeed partitioned and thus unequally divided, can be critically examined by laying bare the conditions from which it emerges as unequal, which adds up to venturing into the point of departure of this divide, i.e. the *equality* of the environment. In this way it becomes possible to notice the individual as an engaged individual, without positioning him either at the periphery or at the centre of his group or community. Moreover, by taking up the equality perspective it becomes possible to allow the engaged individual to appear as an observing instance that can challenges what pertains at the group level. In this way the engaged individual can overcome the constraints that reign at the group level of which Lewin states that "…it is not the similarity or dissimilarity of individuals that constitutes a group, but interdependence of faith" (Lewin, 1939, p. 165). Change, according to Lewin, is then about analysing the situation correctly. However, such *interdependent* 'faith' can easily be replaced by a *dependence* upon the 'ideals' that prevail. Moreover, Lewins perspective on change leaves little room for *capturing* change, i.e. for *observing*

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[9] This position refers to the way Kant defines the principle of the anticipations of perception of which he states that: "In all appearances the real which is an object of sensation has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree" (Kant, 1996, p. 238).

the prevailing interactions at the group level and hardly leaves room for allowing a supplement of meaning to be articulated and negotiated at the level of the community.

A more recent voice even tackles the ability of analysing change adequately as

> … a practice of social and historical explanation, sensitive to structure but aware of contingency, is not yet at hand. We must build it as we go along, by reconstructing the available tools of social science and social theory. Its absence denies us a credible account of how transformation happens (Unger, 1998, p. 24).

Contrary to these positions, the point of departure that is here presented takes of from the perspective that all individuals can *observe* their environment and can, from the particularity of their observations, *analyse* the situation, *makes choices* as to which analysis is relevant and engage in a procedure of *negotiation*.[10] While an adequate theory on how transformation happens might indeed not be at hand, transformation *does* happen. Moreover, *that* transformation happens is something maybe only individuals can observe, analyze, make choices upon and negotiate, which is exactly the opposite of the scientific business that is only concerned with measuring *what* is precisely happening. Only by taking part in the process is which individuals perform the 'emancipatory imperative' in which observation, analysis, making choices and negotiation function as the axioms, the task of the researcher can become one in which interactions can be verified on the basis of the way individuals – in co-operation with the scientist – engage in interactions that cross and thereby challenge the boundaries of their own group and engage and supplement the boundaries set forward at the community level.

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