Thinking Machines : a Paraconsistent Evaluation of an Ab/use of the Gödel Theorems

Gödel's theorems have been used for various ends since their establishment in 1931. One of those ends is that of Robert Rosen in his defence of a new paradigm for biology, assimilating closed causal loops as among others a way to understand anticipatory systems. We will argue how this use of Gödel's theorems arise from Gödel's own Platonist interpretation of the theorems. Next, we will argue against that interpretation from the perspective of dialetheism, which is the statement that contradictions can simply be true. In order to do so, we will emphasize the analogy between the G-sentence in the Gödel theorems and the famous liar-paradox. Finally, we will outline the consequences of this reinterpretation for the argument of Rosen.